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Introduction 
 
Many problems in economics can be understood as matchmaking problems, in the 
following sense. We have two sets, and we need to pair up elements of the first set with 
elements of the second set.  For example, the first set could be people looking for a job, 
while the second set might be employers looking for employees. Elements of both sets 
are assumed to have preferences over those with whom they could be paired. The 
problem is then, how do we find the best matching between individuals from both sets? 
This problem was first studied in the early 1960s, by David Gale and Lloyd S. Shapley 
[Gale-Shapley-1962].  They proposed a simple and elegant algorithm to solve the 
problem, and showed that this algorithm was, in a precise sense, optimal. For this 
foundational work, Shapley was a joint recipient, with Alvin Roth, of the 2012 Nobel 
Prize in Economics (see Sidebar One: Lloyd S. Shapley). Sadly, Gale passed away before 
the award was made (see Sidebar Two: David Gale). For computer scientists, one 
intriguing aspect of Shapley’s award is that it was made, at least in part, for an 
algorithmic research contribution. Our aim in this article is to give you a feel for what 
matching problems are, how the Gale-Shapley algorithm solves them, and some possible 
applications of matching techniques. 
 
The Stable Marriage Problem 
 
Let us consider the basic problem that is solved by the Gale-Shapley algorithm. The 
problem is one of finding stable matchings. Following the original paper on this subject, 
the problem is usually described in terms of matching potential husbands with potential 
wives. Although this “marriage market” scenario may not seem at first sight to be terribly 
plausible, we will later see that in fact it reflects the structure of many important real-
world economic problems. Here is how the problem was originally described: 
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A certain community consists of n men and n women. Each person ranks those of 
the opposite sex in accordance with his or her preferences for a marriage partner. 
We seek a satisfactory way of marrying off all members of the community. […] 
We call a set of marriages unstable if there are a man and a woman who are not 
married to each other but prefer each other to their actual partner. [Gale-Shapley-
1962] 
 
A little more formally, we have two disjoint sets, the set of men M and the set of women 
W, each of size n. Each man has a personal ranking of the women, and each woman has a 
personal ranking of the men. To keep things simple, we can assume the rankings are 
simply linear lists of all members of the opposite sex, indicating most preferred down to 
least preferred. Consider the following example (taken from [Gale-Shapley-1962]). 
Suppose n = 3, and that the men M = {X, Y, Z} and women W = {A, B, C} have rankings 
as follows: 
 
EXAMPLE 1. 
Men X: A  B  C 
Y: B  C  A 
Z: C  A  B 
 
Women A:   Y  Z  X 
B:   Z  X  Y 
C:   X  Y  Z 
 
Thus, X ranks A first, then B, then C, while Y ranks B first, then C, then A. The goal is to 
come up with a matching. A matching is just a mapping from men to women such that 
every man is mapped to a unique woman, and, conversely, every woman is mapped to a 
unique man. In mathematical terms, a mapping is a bijective function µ : M → W, and so 
µ(m) = w means that under the matching µ, man m is matched to woman w. The 
following is a matching for Example 1: 
 
 µ(X) = A; µ(Y) = B; µ(Z) = C. 
 
This matching pairs man X with woman A, man Y with woman B, and man Z with woman 
C. Since the mapping µ is a bijection, we can safely cheat a little with our notation, and 
write µ(w) = m to mean that the woman w is matched up with the man m; thus µ(B) = Y in 
the above matching, for example. 
 
In contrast, the following is not a matching, since it associates the same woman (A) with 
two men: 
 
 µ(X) = A; µ(Y) = B; µ(Z) = A. 
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Now, the goal of the matching process is not just to find a matching, but to find a good 
matching. There are at least two properties that we look for in a good matching. The first 
is stability. A matching is said to be stable if there is no man-woman pair who would 
prefer each other to the partners that they are matched with. Expressed a little more 
formally,  µ is stable if there is no man m and woman w such that: 
 
• m prefers w to µ(m), and  
• w prefers m to µ(w). 
 
So, if a matching is stable, then there will be no man-woman pair who would prefer to 
elope. Returning to our example above, there are several stable matchings.  For example, 
consider the matching in which all the men are matched with their first choice women: 
µ(X) = A, µ(Y) = B, and µ(Z) = C. Since every man gets their first choice, there can be no 
man/woman pair who would rather elope than be with the partner they are matched with. 
By the same argument, the matching in which every woman is paired with her most 
preferred man is also stable. However, not all matchings are stable for this scenario: 
consider  µ(X) = C, µ(Y) = B, and µ(Z) = A. In this case, X and B would prefer to elope.  
 
Let’s see another example. 
 
EXAMPLE 2. 
Men X:   A  C  B 
Y:   A  C  B 
Z:   C  A  B 
 
Women A:   Y  Z  X 
B:   Z  X  Y 
C:   Z  X  Y 
 
Here, for example, the matching with µ(X) = B, µ(Y) = A, and µ(Z) = C is stable.  
 
Stability forms our basic criterion for a good matching, but it is not the only one. In 
addition, we might consider optimality requirements to be important. However, 
formulating optimality is slightly tricky, because whether or not we judge a matching to 
be optimal can depend on whether we adopt the perspective of the men or the women. 
We say a stable matching is M-optimal if it is at least as good as any other stable 
matching for all the men; and similarly, we say a stable matching is W-optimal if it is at 
least as good as any other stable matching for all the women. For Example 1, the 
matching where every man gets their most preferred woman is M-optimal but not W-
optimal, while the matching in which every woman gets their first choice man is W-
optimal but not M-optimal.   
 
The Gale-Shapley Algorithm 
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We have now seen the basic problem that we want to address: finding stable matchings 
between sets of individuals. However, we haven’t yet seen how to find such matchings, 
or even whether stable matchings always exist. Moreover, if there are n men and n 
women, there will be n! possible matchings in total, and so exhaustively searching 
through the whole set of matchings will not be practicable: this raises the question of 
whether we can find stable matchings in polynomial time. We now introduce the Gale-
Shapley algorithm (also sometimes called the deferred acceptance algorithm), which has 
some remarkable properties. First, it demonstrates that a stable matching always exists, 
and guarantees to always find such a matching. Second, it guarantees to find an M-
optimal matching (or, with a simple tweak, a W-optimal matching). Third, it is 
computationally efficient: it runs in linear time.  
 
The algorithm is as follows: 
 
1. Each man m proposes to his most-preferred woman. Each woman who receives 
one or more proposals accepts the proposal of the man she prefers the most 
among those who propose to her; she rejects all the others. Men whose proposals 
are rejected remain single for the time being. When a man has a proposal 
accepted, we say the man and corresponding woman are engaged. Engagement is 
not in any way binding at this stage.  
 
2. Each man who remains single after the previous stage proposes to the woman he 
most prefers among those he has not previously proposed to (in other words, he 
goes to the next woman on his list). Each woman who is not currently engaged 
who receives proposals accepts the proposal of the most preferred man, and 
rejects the rest. Each woman who is currently engaged accepts the proposal of 
whoever she most prefers, from the set of men she receives proposals from and 
the man she is currently engaged to; she rejects the rest (this may mean rejecting 
the person she is currently engaged to). Rejected men are then single. 
 
3. Repeat stage (2) until everybody is engaged, at which point the set of current 
engagements becomes the final matching. 
 
If we run the algorithm with preferences as in Example 1, we see that the men each make 
proposals to their most desired women, which are all accepted; everybody is then 
engaged, and the algorithm then terminates. 
 
If we run the algorithm with preferences as in Example 2, then on the first round, X 
proposes to A, Y proposes to A, and Z proposes to C. The proposals of Y and Z will be 
accepted, but the proposal of X will be rejected. Thus X and B remain single; on the next 
round, X proposes to C but is rejected because C’s current engagement to Z is preferred 
by C. In the next round, X proposes to B and is accepted. The matching we end up with is 
µ(X) = B, µ(Y) = A, and µ(Z) = C. 
 
Let us consider properties of the algorithm. First, it is easy to see that it is guaranteed to 
terminate – the worst case would require O(n2) rounds, and so the algorithm runs in 
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polynomial time. (With an appropriate choice of data structure, this can be improved to 
linear time.) Also, it should be obvious that the matching produced is stable. Otherwise, 
there would be some man/woman pair who would rather be with each other than with the 
partner they are paired with in the final set of engagements. But since the man prefers the 
woman over his final engagement, he must have previously proposed to her and been 
rejected. So the woman cannot prefer the man over her final engagement. By a similar 
argument, we can see that the matching produced is M-optimal. To find a W-optimal 
matching, we simply have to swap the roles of men and women, so that the women are 
the ones making proposals. 
 
Matching Problems in Practice 
 
In their original paper on stable matching, Gale and Shapley wrote: “In making the 
special assumptions needed in order to analyze our problem mathematically, we 
[eventually] abandoned reality altogether and entered the world of mathematical make-
believe. The practical-minded reader may rightfully ask whether any contribution has 
been made toward an actual solution of the original problem.” 
 
Interestingly, not only has the Gale-Shapley algorithm since been put to use in a wide 
range of application domains in many countries worldwide, but also, when they wrote 
their paper, Gale and Shapley were unaware that their algorithm was in fact already in 
use on a large scale, and had been so utilised for some eleven years prior to the 
publication of their paper! 
 
To describe this interesting chronology in more detail, we rewind to the first half of the 
20th Century, where in the United States medical interns sought positions at hospitals as 
part of their postgraduate medical education.  The hospitals had more open positions than 
there were interns, resulting in a competition for the latter.  As a consequence, many 
problems ensued: for example prospective interns were being signed up for an internship 
years before they started.  Several solutions were proposed and tried, all with very limited 
success.  The breakthrough came at the beginning of the 1950s with a voluntary program 
called NIMP (National Intern Matching Program), designed by J. M. Stalnaker and F. J. 
Mullin.  Medical students and hospitals could now submit their preferences over one 
another, and an algorithm was then used to produce the allocation of students to hospitals. 
 
In the 1970s it was observed that this algorithm was essentially equivalent to the 
“hospital-proposing” version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm (see Sidebar 2: David Gale).  
Here, the algorithm is an extension of the one described above for the Stable Marriage 
problem, which Gale and Shapley presented in the context of assigning students to 
colleges.  However the model involving the assignment of medical residents to hospitals 
is entirely equivalent to the problem solved by the Gale-Shapley algorithm. 
 
The NIMP, now known as the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), survives to 
this day.  In 2012, no less than 38,777 aspiring medical residents applied for 26,772 
available residency positions via the NRMP.  Counterparts of the NRMP are in existence 
in many other countries, including Canada, Japan, and the UK.  It is the stability of the 
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constructed matching that is seen as being crucial to the success of the NRMP and other 
similar centralised matching schemes. 
 
The Gale-Shapley algorithm is also used in many other contexts, for example in public 
school admissions in Boston and New York.  The inputs include the preferences of 
pupils’ parents over schools, and school “preferences” are determined through priority 
levels for pupils based on factors such as geographical location, sibling already at the 
school, etc. 
 
Previously in Boston and New York, so-called “priority-based mechanisms” were used 
which led to widespread strategic behaviour on the part of the applicants, since it was 
often unsafe for applicants to submit their true preferences.  This led to much uncertainty 
and dissatisfaction with the mechanism on the part of parents (and other stakeholders).  
One major advantage of the applicant-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm is that it is 
strategy-proof for that side of the market.  This means that it is safe for an applicant to 
reveal their true preferences, because they cannot obtain a better outcome by falsifying 
their preferences. 
 
In New York, around 90,000 students enter high school each year.  Prior to the 
mechanism being changed to the Gale-Shapley algorithm in 2003, around 30,000 students 
were allocated to schools that they had not ranked on their preference list.  In the first 
year of operation of the new scheme, this number dropped to around 3,000. 
 
The Gale-Shapley algorithm has been applied in many other settings, including: 
 
• assigning children to daycare places in Denmark; 
• higher education admission in Hungary and Spain; 
• university faculty recruitment in France; 
• placing military cadets in branches in the USA; 
• placement of graduating rabbis in the USA and Israel; 
• online dating in the USA and online matrimony in India; 
• auction mechanisms for sponsored search in internet search engines. 
 
It is likely that, with the increasing tendency for administrative processes to be handled 
online, and given the relative ease with which participants’ preferences can be collected 
by this route, the potential for deploying the Gale-Shapley algorithm within centralised 
clearinghouses will only grow further. 
 
Conclusions 
 
At first sight, matchmaking problems of the kind discussed in this article may seem 
almost too simple to be of interest to theoreticians, and too unrealistic to be applicable in 
real-world settings. And yet, such problems turn out not only to be fascinating to work 
with from the point of view of mathematics and computing, but also have many practical 
and important applications.   
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Sidebar One: Lloyd S. Shapley 
 
Few academics can have made such a sustained and high-level contribution to their 
discipline as Lloyd S. Shapley. Born on June 2, 1923 to an academic family in 
Cambridge, MA, Shapley gained a Bronze Star for work on breaking enemy codes for the 
Army Air Corps during World War II. After the war, Shapley studied mathematics at 
Princeton, gaining his first degree in 1948. His PhD was supervised by Albert W. Tucker 
and he was awarded his research degree in 1953 – just three years after game theory 
legend John Forbes Nash gained his PhD under the same supervisor. He then worked at 
the RAND Corporation (see Sidebar Three: The RAND Corporation) until 1981, when he 
joined the faculty of UCLA. He spent the remainder of his working life at UCLA, and 
remains a Professor Emeritus to the present day. 
 
Shapley’s contributions to game theory and economics have been wide-ranging and 
fundamentally important. Apart from his work on game-theoretic matching, which we 
describe in the main body of the article, Shapley’s best-known contribution is a 
“solution” for cooperative game theory – a solution that we now call the Shapley value. 
Roughly speaking, the problem that Shapley considered was the following. Suppose a 
group of agents work together, and cooperatively obtain some payoff, which can be 
shared amongst members of the team in any way that the team choose. Then, what is a 
fair way to divide the value a team obtains amongst members of that team? Shapley’s 
approach was ingenious and hugely influential. First, he proposed a set of axioms, which 
he suggested that any fair payoff division scheme should satisfy. For example, he argued 
that players who are identical in terms of their contributions should receive the same 
payoff, and that players who make no contribution should receive nothing. Then, he 
defined a particular payoff distribution scheme, and showed that in fact this scheme is the 
only payoff scheme that satisfies the axioms. The basic idea behind what we now call the 
Shapley value is, crudely, that a team participant should be paid his expected marginal 
contribution: the amount that the player could be expected to contribute, on average, to a 
team selected at random. By only paying players according to the amount they contribute, 
we ensure fairness. Shapley’s analysis remains at the heart of cooperative game theory, 
and has led to a huge body of subsequent research.  
 
In October 2012, it was announced that the 89-year old Shapley would receive the 2012 
Nobel Prize in Economics, jointly with Stanford economist Alvin E. Roth. The award 
citation was “for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design.” From 
a computer science perspective, this award was particularly interesting because it was 
arguably the first time the citation for a Nobel prize referred to an algorithmic 
contribution: the algorithm in question being, of course, the Gale-Shapley algorithm. 
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Sidebar Two: David Gale 
 
David Gale (13 December 1921 – 7 March 2008) was a professor of mathematics at the 
University of California, Berkeley, and during his career he made fundamental 
contributions to mathematics, game theory, and convex analysis. 
 
He was born in Manhattan and received his PhD from Princeton in 1949.  He was, of 
course, the joint author with Lloyd Shapley of the seminal paper “College Admissions 
and the Stability of Marriage,” appearing in American Mathematical Monthly in 1962. 
Marilda Sotomayor, a long-standing colleague and friend of Gale, wrote that Gale 
realised in the 1970s that the algorithm he first published with Shapley had in fact been 
used since 1951 to allocate medical interns to residency positions in the United States. 
 
Another important contribution of Gale was his “Top trading cycles algorithm” which 
appeared in 1974 (in fact in a paper authored by Shapley and Scarf).  This algorithm has 
been of fundamental importance in economics and has been applied in the context of 
school choice and in the allocation of kidney donors to patients. 
 
In 1980, David Gale shared the von Neumann Theory Prize with Harold Kuhn and Albert 
Tucker for their seminal role in laying the foundations of game theory, linear and non-
linear programming. 
 
According to an obituary by the University of California at Berkeley, in a note to Gale's 
family following his death, Al Roth wrote that Gale “has had a giant influence in 
economics as well as in mathematics” and mentioned that he had nominated Gale and 
Shapley to the Nobel Committee for Economics.  David Gale would surely have been a 
joint recipient in 2012 had he lived longer. 
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Sidebar Three: The RAND Corporation 
 
The RAND (“Research and Development”) Corporation was founded in the aftermath of 
World War II, with the laudable and seemingly innocuous goal of promoting what we 
would now call technology transfer – taking theoretical ideas from mathematics, 
economics, logistics, and operations research, and applying them in real-world settings. 
An offshoot of the Douglas Aircraft Company, RAND enjoyed a close relationship with 
the US military from its foundation. In the 1950s and 60s, the work of RAND became 
very closely linked with cold-war military doctrine in the public perception. Many of the 
leading early proponents of game theory worked at RAND at some stage in their careers, 
including Lloyd Shapley, John Nash, John von Neumann, Kenneth Arrow, Thomas 
Schelling, Melvin Dresher, and Merill Flood, as well as hugely influential 
mathematicians such as Richard Bellman, the father of dynamic programming.  
 
However, the researcher who did probably most to define the public perception of RAND 
was Herman Kahn. Born in 1922, Kahn was a futurist, who gained notoriety for trying to 
think rationally about something that most people regard as unthinkable: nuclear war. His 
1960 book On Thermonuclear War set out his views on the subject, and it was perhaps 
the suggestion in this book that such a war was winnable that subsequently made it 
notorious. Many people believed it was only the idea that nuclear war was unwinnable 
that prevented the military from using nuclear weapons; the idea that RAND were 
apparently undertaking serious studies into how a nuclear war might be fought was for 
many an appallingly cold-hearted prospect. Kahn’s views became widely associated with 
RAND, even to the point where they were parodied in Hollywood movies and made the 
subject of popular songs. In Stanley Kubrick’s blistering cold-war satire Dr Strangelove, 
a mad scientist enthusiastically refers to a study by “The BLAND Corporation.” Folk 
singer Pete Seeger’s 1961 protest song RAND Hymn claimed “they think all day long for 
a fee/they sit and play games about going up in flames.” So strong was the popular 
association between RAND, game theory, and nuclear war that this association ultimately 
contorted public perceptions of the discipline of game theory itself [Poundstone-1992]. 
 
 
